The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
- Peski, Marcin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Barron, Daniel, 2017. "Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
- Sebastian Kranz, 2013.
"Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:185-198 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 19 May 2018.
- Sebastian Kranz, 2012.
"Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
- Kimmo Berg, 2016. "Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 304-323, September.
- Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
- Aislinn Bohren, 2018. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2018.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014.
"Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles 11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015.
"Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2014. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000881, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
- Herings P.J.J. & Meshalkin A. & Predtetchinski A., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
- repec:spr:joecth:v:66:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1060-1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aiba, Katsuhiko, 2014. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 58-66.
- John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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Keywords
Stochastic game Folk theorem Self-generation Return-generation Imperfect public monitoring;Statistics
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