Private observation and Communication and Collusion
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- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002.
"Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA.
- Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(4), pages 431-456.
- Ehud Lehrer, 1988. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part II: revelation through communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 257-261, March.
- Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
- Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
- Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69.
- Lehrer, E, 1989. "Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(1), pages 57-89. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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