IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs

Listed author(s):
  • Heidhues, Paul
  • Rady, Sven
  • Strack, Philipp

We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that the equilibrium number of experiments is at most one plus the number of experiments that a single agent would perform. When payoffs are private information and players can communicate via cheap talk, the socially optimal symmetric experimentation profile can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for sufficiently optimistic prior beliefs. These results generalize to more than two players whenever the success probability per period is not too high. In particular, this is the case when successes occur at the jump times of a Poisson process and the period length is sufficiently small.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14041/1/387.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 387.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2012
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:387
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany

Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

  1. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June.
  2. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, 05.
  3. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Collaborating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 632-663, April.
  4. Francesco Squintani & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2005. "Preemption Games with Private Information," 2005 Meeting Papers 80, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2010. "Keeping Your Options Open," RCER Working Papers 557, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  6. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Mariotti, Thomas, 2004. "Investment timing and learning externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 80-102, September.
  7. Rosenberg, Dinah & Salomon , Antoine & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "On Games of Strategic Experimentation," Les Cahiers de Recherche 1008, HEC Paris.
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Johannes Horner & Nicolas Klein & Sven Rady, 2014. "Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1956, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August.
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1292, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  13. Cripps, Martin & Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2003. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Discussion Papers in Economics 4, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  14. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems," Discussion Papers 1396, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. David Besanko & Jianjun Wu, 2013. "The Impact of Market Structure and Learning on the Tradeoff between R&D Competition and Cooperation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 166-201, 03.
  16. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
  17. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
  18. Sven Rady & Godfrey Keller, 2007. "Strategic Experimentation with Poisson Bandits," 2007 Meeting Papers 332, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  19. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 185-202, October.
  20. Jay P. Choi, 1991. "Dynamic R&D Competition under "Hazard Rate" Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 596-610, Winter.
  21. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
  22. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1726R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2013.
  23. David A. Malueg & Shunichi O. Tsutsui, 1997. "Dynamic R&D Competition with Learning," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 751-772, Winter.
  24. Pauli Murto & Juuso Välimäki, 2011. "Learning and Information Aggregation in an Exit Game," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1426-1461.
  25. Sven Rady & Nicolas Klein, 2008. "Negatively Correlated Bandits," 2008 Meeting Papers 136, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  26. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
  27. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1726rrr is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Caroline D. Thomas, 2010. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," Department of Economics Working Papers 130813, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2013.
  29. Daron Acemoglu & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2008. "Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation," NBER Working Papers 14408, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000671, David K. Levine.
  31. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Incentives for Experimenting Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1726R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2013.
  32. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
  33. Marina Halac & Navin Kartik & Qingmin Liu, 2016. "Optimal Contracts for Experimentation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 1040-1091.
  34. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
  35. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1726rr is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  37. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12074 is not listed on IDEAS
  38. Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Incentives for experimenting agents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 632-663, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.