IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Should the Flatterers be Avoided?

  • Nicolas Klein

    (University of Bonn)

  • Tymofiy Mylovanov

    (Penn State University)

Registered author(s):

    We analyze a dynamic career concerns game between an expert and a decision maker. In each period, the decision maker has the option of obtaining cheap-talk advice from the expert, who is merely interested in his continued employment. The expert's quality is initially unknown to both parties. The incentive problem is that the expert might attempt to avoid appearing uninformed by concealing his true opinion if it contradicts the predominant view. Nevertheless, if a competent expert never makes mistakes, the fully revealing first-best outcome can be implemented provided the time horizon is sufficiently long. For shorter time horizons, the optimal equilibrium in this case features a grace period during which the expert accumulates some private information about his quality.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: https://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2011/paper_1273.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 1273.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:red:sed011:1273
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
    Fax: 1-314-444-8731
    Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2008. "A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1680, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2000. "Experimentation in Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 213-34, April.
    4. Sven Rady & Godfrey Keller, 2007. "Strategic Experimentation with Poisson Bandits," 2007 Meeting Papers 332, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251, 04.
    6. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
    7. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation with Undiscounted Bandits," 2005 Meeting Papers 473, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Cripps, Martin & Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2003. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Discussion Papers in Economics 4, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    9. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1125-49, September.
    10. Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2009. "Strategic Experimentation with Poisson Bandits," Discussion Papers in Economics 10575, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:1273. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.