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Keeping Your Options Open

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Guillaume Forand

    (W. Allen Wallis Institute, University of Rochester)

Abstract

In standard models of experimentation, the costs of project development consist of (i) the direct cost of running trials as well as (ii) the implicit opportunity cost of leaving alternative projects idle. Another natural type of experimentation cost, the cost of holding on to the option of developing a currently inactive project, has not been studied. In a (multi-armed bandit) model of experimentation in which inactive projects have explicit maintenance costs and can be irreversibly discarded, I fully characterise the optimal experimentation policy and show that the decision-maker's incentive to actively manage its options has important implications for the order of project development. In the model, an experimenter searches for a success among a number of projects by choosing both those to develop now and those to maintain for (potential) future development. In the absence of maintenance costs, the optimal experimentation policy has a 'stay-with-the-winner' property: the projects that are more likely to succeed are developed first. Maintenance costs provide incentives to bring the option value of less promising projects forward, and under the optimal experimentation policy, projects that are less likely to succeed are sometimes developed first. A project development strategy of 'going-with-the-loser' strikes a balance between the cost of discarding possibly valuable options and the cost of leaving them open.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Guillaume Forand, 2010. "Keeping Your Options Open," RCER Working Papers 557, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:557
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Strategic experimentation with private payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 531-551.
    3. Ke, T. Tony & Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 2019. "Optimal learning before choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 383-437.
    4. Mayskaya, Tatiana, 2024. "Following beliefs or excluding the worst? The role of unfindable state in learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    5. Gneezy, Uri & Nelidov, Vadim & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2023. "When opportunities backfire: Alternatives reduce perseverance and success in task completion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 304-324.
    6. Christoph Carnehl & Johannes Schneider, 2023. "On Risk and Time Pressure: When to Think and When to Do," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 1-47.
    7. Alejandro Francetich, 2014. "Managing Multiple Research Projects," Working Papers 516, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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