On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) obtain. As a second corollary, in the context of repeated games, it follows that this limit set of payoffs is a polytope (a bounded polyhedron) when attention is restricted to equilibria in pure strategies. We provide a two-player game in which this limit set is not a polytope when mixed strategies are considered.
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- Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2011. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(4), pages 1277-1318, 07.
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