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- Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
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- Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017. "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 783-812, March.
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