IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pra219.html
   My authors  Follow this author

David Rahman

Personal Details

First Name:David
Middle Name:
Last Name:Rahman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pra219
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~dmr/
Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall 1925 Fourth Street South Minneapolis, MN 55455.

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, Minnesota (United States)
http://www.econ.umn.edu/
RePEc:edi:deumnus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David Rahman, 2008. "The Alternative to Equilibrium Existence," Working Papers 2009-1, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics.
  2. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2008. "Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002236, David K. Levine.
  3. Giulio Federico & David Rahman, 2000. "Bidding in an electricity pay-as-bid auction," Economics Papers 2001-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Apr 2001.

Articles

  1. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
  2. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
  3. David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2010. "Mediated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 285-308, January.
  4. Federico, Giulio & Rahman, David, 2003. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 175-211, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.

    Mentioned in:

    1. “The Power of Communication,” D. Rahman (2014)
      by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2015-04-25 01:40:51

Working papers

  1. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2008. "Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002236, David K. Levine.

    Cited by:

    1. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
    2. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2009. "Efficient tournaments within teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 103-119, March.

  2. Giulio Federico & David Rahman, 2000. "Bidding in an electricity pay-as-bid auction," Economics Papers 2001-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Apr 2001.

    Cited by:

    1. Estrella Alonso & Gustavo Juan Tejada, 2012. "The Auction Model with Lowest Risk in a Duopolistic Electricity Market," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 3-21, January-D.
    2. Sven Heim & Georg Götz, 2013. "Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201324, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Andreas Voss and Reinhard Madlener, 2017. "Auction Schemes, Bidding Strategies and the Cost-Optimal Level of Promoting Renewable Electricity in Germany," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(KAPSARC S).
    4. Gert Brunekreeft & Roland Meyer & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2013. "Auction Design for a Strategic Reserve Market for Generation Adequacy: On the Incentives Under Different Auction Scoring Rules," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0014, Bremen Energy Research.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Li, Gong & Shi, Jing & Qu, Xiuli, 2011. "Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy optimization in the liberalized electricity spot market–A state-of-the-art review," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 4686-4700.
    7. Silvia Concettini, 2014. "Merit order effect and strategic investments in intermittent generation technologies," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-44, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    8. T. S. Genc, 2009. "Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 9-31, January.
    9. Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, 2006. "Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00569121, HAL.
    10. Anna Pechan & Christine Brandstätt & Gert Brunekreeft & Martin Palovic, "undated". "Risks and incentives for gaming in electricity redispatch markets," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0043, Bremen Energy Research.
    11. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    13. Dejan Trifunović & Bojan Ristić, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions In The Procurement Of Electricity," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 58(197), pages 47-78, April – J.
    14. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David, 2009. "The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions," Working Paper Series 812, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    15. Viehmann, Johannes & Lorenczik, Stefan & Malischek, Raimund, 2021. "Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: An agent-based Q-learning approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    16. Shan Shan & Siliang Yang & Victor Becerra & Jiamei Deng & Honglei Li, 2023. "A Case Study of Existing Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Platforms: Calling for Integrated Platform Features," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(23), pages 1-22, November.
    17. Enikő Kácsor, 2021. "Modelling Bidding Behaviour on German Photovoltaic Auctions," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-32, January.
    18. Willems, Bert & Pollitt, Michael & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik & Banet, Catherine, 2022. "The European Wholesale Electricty Market: From Crisis to Net Zero," Other publications TiSEM 2f225964-853e-4d30-a46d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Giulietti, Monica & Grossi, Luigi & Waterson, Michael, 2010. "Price transmission in the UK electricity market: Was NETA beneficial?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1165-1174, September.
    20. Majid Motamedi & Shahram Moeeni & Salman Gharakhani & Iman Keyfarokhi, 2014. "The Behavior of Iranian Restructured Electricity Market in Supply Function Equilibrium Framework," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 4(1), pages 178-191, January.
    21. Liu, Shuangquan & Yang, Qiang & Cai, Huaxiang & Yan, Minghui & Zhang, Maolin & Wu, Dianning & Xie, Mengfei, 2019. "Market reform of Yunnan electricity in southwestern China: Practice, challenges and implications," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-1.
    22. Pär Holmberg, 2009. "Supply function equilibria of pay-as-bid auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 154-177, October.
    23. Yu, Liying & Wang, Peng & Chen, Zhe & Li, Dewen & Li, Ning & Cherkaoui, Rachid, 2023. "Finding Nash equilibrium based on reinforcement learning for bidding strategy and distributed algorithm for ISO in imperfect electricity market," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 350(C).
    24. Growitsch, Christian & Müller, Gernot & Rammerstorfer, Margarethe & Weber, Christoph, 2007. "Determinanten der Preisentwicklung auf dem deutschen Minutenreservemarkt," WIK Discussion Papers 300, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    25. Di Xiao & Andreas Krause, 2022. "Bank demand for central bank liquidity and its impact on interbank markets," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(3), pages 639-679, July.
    26. Viehmann, Johannes & Lorenczik, Stefan & Malischek, Raimund, 2018. "Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: an agent-based Q-learning approach," EWI Working Papers 2018-3, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    27. Sebastian Just, 2011. "Appropriate contract durations in the German markets for on-line reserve capacity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 194-220, April.
    28. Von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M. & Fabra, Natalia & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles, 2008. "Investment Incentives and Auction Design in Electricity Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6626, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    29. Jae-Do Song & Young-Hwan Ahn, 2021. "Price Discovery of Consignment Auctions for Emission Permits," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-13, October.
    30. Vítor Marques & Isabel Soares & Adelino Fortunato, 2008. "Uniform Price Market and Behaviour Pattern: What Does the Iberian Electricity Market Point Out?," GEMF Working Papers 2008-08, GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra.
    31. Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, 2006. "Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets," Post-Print hal-00569121, HAL.
    32. Just, Sebastian & Weber, Christoph, 2008. "Pricing of reserves: Valuing system reserve capacity against spot prices in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 3198-3221, November.
    33. Estrella Alonso & Juan Tejada, 2010. "Equivalencia de Ingresos en un Duopolio Eléctrico," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 47(136), pages 191-215.
    34. Prandini, Alberto, 2007. "Good, BETTA, best? The role of industry structure in electricity reform in Scotland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1628-1642, March.
    35. Liu, Zhen & Zhang, Xiliang & Lieu, Jenny, 2010. "Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 1813-1819.
    36. Holmberg, Pär, 2005. "Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions," Working Paper Series 2005:17, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    37. Ghaninejad, Mousa, 2020. "عرضه، تقاضا، و پیشنهاد قیمت در بازار برق ایران [Supply, Demand, and Bidding in Iran’s Electricity Market]," MPRA Paper 105340, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    38. Jorge Barrientos Marin & Hector Gomez Marin, 2022. "Oligopoly and Collusion in the Colombian Electricity Market," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 12(3), pages 125-134, May.
    39. Yotam Gafni & Aviv Yaish, 2022. "Greedy Transaction Fee Mechanisms for (Non-)myopic Miners," Papers 2210.07793, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    40. Bunn, Derek & Koc, Veli & Sapio, Alessandro, 2015. "Resource externalities and the persistence of heterogeneous pricing behavior in an energy commodity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 265-275.
    41. K. Ruddell & A. B. Philpott & A. Downward, 2017. "Supply Function Equilibrium with Taxed Benefits," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 1-18, February.
    42. K. Ruddell & A. B. Philpott & A. Downward, 2017. "Supply Function Equilibrium with Taxed Benefits," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 1-18, February.
    43. Ricardo Moreno & Diego Larrahondo, 2021. "The First Auction of Non-Conventional Renewable Energy in Colombia: Results and Perspectives," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 11(1), pages 528-535.
    44. Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, 2006. "Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets," Grenoble Ecole de Management (Post-Print) hal-00569121, HAL.
    45. Zou, Xiaoyan, 2009. "Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4231-4239, November.
    46. Hästö, Peter & Holmberg, Pär, 2005. "Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions," Working Paper Series 2005:23, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    47. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    48. Müller, Gernot & Rammerstorfer, Margarethe, 2008. "A theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 2620-2627, July.
    49. Swider, Derk J. & Weber, Christoph, 2007. "Bidding under price uncertainty in multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auctions for power systems reserve," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 181(3), pages 1297-1308, September.
    50. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society.

Articles

  1. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.

    Cited by:

    1. M. Hasanuzzaman & Ummu Salamah Zubir & Nur Iqtiyani Ilham & Hang Seng Che, 2017. "Global electricity demand, generation, grid system, and renewable energy polices: a review," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), May.
    2. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    3. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03760756, HAL.
    4. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    5. Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    6. Tóbiás, Áron, 2023. "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 50-80.
    7. B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, 2014. "Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels," NBER Working Papers 19993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Yi Tang & Feng Li & Chenyi Zheng & Qi Wang & Yingjun Wu, 2018. "PMU Measurement-Based Intelligent Strategy for Power System Controlled Islanding," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, January.
    9. Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2021. "Analytical Method for Mechanism Design in Partially Observable Markov Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-15, February.
    10. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 193-216, March.
    11. William López-Castrillón & Héctor H. Sepúlveda & Cristian Mattar, 2021. "Off-Grid Hybrid Electrical Generation Systems in Remote Communities: Trends and Characteristics in Sustainability Solutions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-29, May.
    12. Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2017. "Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168309, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Post-Print halshs-03760756, HAL.
    14. Sofana Reka. S & Tomislav Dragičević & Pierluigi Siano & S.R. Sahaya Prabaharan, 2019. "Future Generation 5G Wireless Networks for Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Review," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-17, June.

  2. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.

    Cited by:

    1. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
    2. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," NBER Working Papers 20315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    4. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Esther Duflo & Michael Greenstone & Rohini Pande & Nicholas Ryan, 2013. "Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India," NBER Working Papers 19259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    7. Fu, Hu & Haghpanah, Nima & Hartline, Jason & Kleinberg, Robert, 2021. "Full surplus extraction from samples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    8. Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret A. Meyer, 2014. "Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000875, David K. Levine.
    9. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 88-91.
    10. , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    11. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Munich Reprints in Economics 78243, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. Celislami, Elda & Kastoryano, Stephen & Mastrobuoni, Giovanni, 2023. "Strategic Bureaucratic Opacity: Evidence from Death Investigation Laws and Police Killings," IZA Discussion Papers 16609, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Bag, Parimal K. & Wang, Peng, 2019. "Input, output or mixed monitoring in teams?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 471-492.
    14. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2016. "Peer discipline and incentives within groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 19-30.
    15. Hino, Yoshifumi, 2019. "An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 47-53.
    16. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    17. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control and Market Size with an Application to Kyrgyzstan Dairy," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235707, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    18. Kanti Parimal Bag & Nona Pepito, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Working Papers hal-01282735, HAL.
    19. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Discussion Papers 14/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    20. Raphael Auer & Cyril Monnet & Hyun Song Shin, 2021. "Distributed ledgers and the governance of money," BIS Working Papers 924, Bank for International Settlements.
    21. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    22. Aldashev, Gani & Zanarone, Giorgio, 2017. "Endogenous enforcement institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 49-64.
    23. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    24. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    25. Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Trusting Privacy in the Cloud," Discussion Paper 2014-047, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    26. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
    27. Lawrence Busch, 2014. "Governance in the age of global markets: challenges, limits, and consequences," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 31(3), pages 513-523, September.
    28. Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    29. Aislinn Bohren & Troy Kravitz, 2016. "Optimal Contracting with Costly State Verification, with an Application to Crowdsourcing," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Jun 2016.
    30. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," Working Papers 062-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    31. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
    32. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001479, UCLA Department of Economics.
    33. Parimal K. Bag & Peng Wang, 2019. "Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 467-495, October.
    34. Bag, Kanti Parimal & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," ESSEC Working Papers WP1603, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    35. Azrieli, Yaron, 2022. "Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 240-254.
    36. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    37. Raphael Auer & Cyril Monnet & Hyun Song Shin, 2021. "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money," Diskussionsschriften dp2101, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    38. Bruno Strulovici, 2020. "Can Society Function Without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective," Papers 2003.05441, arXiv.org.
    39. Andrei Barbos, 2022. "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 119-154, March.
    40. Seung Han Yoo, 2016. "Organizational Design with Non-Contractible Quality," Discussion Paper Series 1604, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    41. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001449, David K. Levine.
    42. Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 858-894, October.

  3. David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2010. "Mediated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 285-308, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
    2. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
    3. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    4. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique & Desrieux, Claudine, 2017. "Choosing ADR or litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 33-40.
    5. Fu, Hu & Haghpanah, Nima & Hartline, Jason & Kleinberg, Robert, 2021. "Full surplus extraction from samples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    6. Strausz, Roland, 2012. "Mediated contracts and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1280-1290.
    7. Hino, Yoshifumi, 2019. "An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 47-53.
    8. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    9. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
    10. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    11. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    12. Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017. "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 783-812, March.
    13. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
    14. De Marco, Giuseppe & Immordino, Giovanni, 2013. "Partnership, reciprocity and team design," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 39-58.

  4. Federico, Giulio & Rahman, David, 2003. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 175-211, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2008-06-21 2008-07-05
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2008-06-21 2008-07-05

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, David Rahman should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.