Pricing of reserves: Valuing system reserve capacity against spot prices in electricity markets
This paper models the interdependencies between markets for secondary reserve capacity and spot electricity to derive the pricing of reserves under equilibrium conditions. Starting with the indifference condition between offering in both markets, the reservation price is derived from the opportunity cost consideration and the unit commitment conditions in a fundamental interrelated market framework. The reserve market examined compares widely to the German market for secondary reserves, but the general approach may also be used to investigate other reserve markets. The approach explores and formalizes the influence of reserve capacity on the spot market supply function. A numerical solution procedure is provided to this non-trivial case of market interaction. The model is used to estimate the expected reservation price development over the last years in Germany.
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