Investment Incentives and Auction Design in Electricity Markets
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Robert Earle & Karl Schmedders & Tymon Tatur, 2007. "On Price Caps Under Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 93-111.
- Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
- Reynolds, Stanley S. & Wilson, Bart J., 2000. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, and Asymmetric Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 122-141, May.
- Federico, Giulio & Rahman, David, 2003. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 175-211, September.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- AUMANN, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2007.
"Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets,"
The Electricity Journal,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 26-37.
- Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2007. "Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets," Papers of Peter Cramton 07cpm, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007.
- Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, 1999.
"Innovation and the Emergence of Market Dominance,"
SOI - Working Papers
9906, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
- Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, 1999. "Innovation and the Emergence of Market Dominance," Working papers 99-18, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, 2000. "Innovation and the Emergence of Market Dominance," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1881, Econometric Society.
- Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey & Enrique Seira, 2004.
"Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions,"
2004.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Susan Athey, 2005. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000098, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000524, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Piccione, Michele & Tan, Guofu, 1996. "Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(3), pages 663-685, August.
- Morten Hviid, 1990.
"Sequential capacity and price choices in a duopoly model with demand uncertainty,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 121-144, June.
- Morten Hviid, 1989. "Sequential Capacity and Price Choices in a Duopoly Model with Demand Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 89-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Bushnell, James & Wolfram, Catherine, 2008. "Electricity Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31547, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sakellaris, Kostis, 2010. "Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 23317, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2010. "Break-up fees and bargaining power in sequential contracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 451-463, September.
More about this item
Keywordselectricity; investment; market design; regulatory reform; uniform price and discriminatory auctions;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-04-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2008-04-12 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2008-04-12 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6626. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.