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Price transmission in the UK electricity market : was NETA beneficial?

Author

Listed:
  • Giulietti, Monica

    (Nottingham University Business School)

  • Grossi, Luigi

    (University of Verona)

  • Waterson, Michael

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between domestic retail electricity prices in Great Britain and their determinants in the particular context of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) introduced in 2001. The analysis requires a consistent comparison of wholesale power price series before and after NETA, which we investigate using a range of wholesale future price series. Despite its stated intention of reducing prices, we conclude that the net effect of NETA alongside other developments instead merely rearranged where money was made in the system.

Suggested Citation

  • Giulietti, Monica & Grossi, Luigi & Waterson, Michael, 2009. "Price transmission in the UK electricity market : was NETA beneficial?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 913, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:913
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Evens Salies and Catherine Waddams Price, 2004. "Charges, Costs and Market Power: the Deregulated UK Electricity Retail Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 19-36.
    2. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7189 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Richard Meade & Seini O’Connor, 2011. "Comparison of Long-term Contracts and Vertical Integration in Decentralized Electricity Markets," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    5. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2008. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 237-266, March.
    6. Andrew Sweeting, 2007. "Market Power In The England And Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 654-685, April.
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    8. Green, Richard J & Joanne Evans, 2003. "Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 92, Royal Economic Society.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/7189 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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