Market Power In The England And Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000
This article shows that generators exercised considerable market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the late 1990s. This is surprising because static oligopoly models predict that falling market concentration should have reduced market power. The article tests the equilibrium assumption of these models that each generator's bids should maximise its short-run profits given the bids of other generators. It finds that the two largest generators could have profitably increased their output from the beginning of 1997. Their behaviour was consistent with tacit collusion. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
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Volume (Year): 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 520 (04)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
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