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Charges, costs and market power in the deregulated UK electricity retail market

Author

Listed:
  • Evens SALIES

    (University of Perpignan & of Paris 1 - Panthéon Sorbonne)

  • Catherine WADDAMS

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

The residential UK electricity market was opened for the first time in 1999, introducing choice of supplier, and about 40% of households changed supplier in the first four years. After three years price caps were removed. We review this process and assess the competitiveness of the market by examining how the charges levied by suppliers depend on cost and demand factors for three different payment methods and consumption levels. We also identify signs of additional market power of incumbency and the effect of levying a tariff with no fixed charge. We find that both cost and demand factors affect charges, and the relationship varies for different payment methods and consumption levels; and that tariffs with no fixed element have different effects for different payment methods. We also conclude that considerable market power seems to remain with potentially adverse distributional effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Evens SALIES & Catherine WADDAMS, 2004. "Charges, costs and market power in the deregulated UK electricity retail market," Industrial Organization 0406003, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0406003 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 23. To appear in The Energy Journal in July 2004 A .pdf version of this paper is available at
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    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/io/papers/0406/0406003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert D. Willig, 1978. "Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 56-69, Spring.
    2. Otero, Jesus & Waddams Price, Catherine, 2001. "Incumbent and entrant response to regulated competition: signaling with accounting costs and market prices2," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 209-223.
    3. Bennett, M & Cooke, D & Catherine Waddams-Price, 2002. "Left out in the cold? New energy tariffs, low-income households and the fuel poor," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 23(2), pages 167-194, June.
    4. repec:ccp:journl:v:53:y:2001:i:2-3:p:209-223 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Catherine Waddams & Ruth Hancock, 1998. "Distributional effects of liberalising UK residential utility markets," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 295-319, August.
    6. Otero, Jesus & Waddams Price, Catherine, 2001. "Price Discrimination, Regulation and Entry in the UK Residential Electricity Market," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 161-175, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & Petter Vegard Hansen, 2010. "Electricity Retailing in Norway," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 25-46.
    2. Pollitt, Michael, 2009. "Evaluating the evidence on electricity reform: Lessons for the South East Europe (SEE) market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 13-23, March.
    3. repec:gam:jeners:v:11:y:2017:i:1:p:8-:d:123802 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11029 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Evens Salies, 2008. "Mergers in the GB electricity market: effects on retail charges," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(11), pages 1483-1490.
    6. Giulietti, Monica & Grossi, Luigi & Waterson, Michael, 2010. "Price transmission in the UK electricity market: Was NETA beneficial?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1165-1174, September.
    7. Aïd, René & Chemla, Gilles & Porchet, Arnaud & Touzi, Nizar, 2011. "Hedging and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 8313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Swadley, Adam & Yücel, Mine, 2011. "Did residential electricity rates fall after retail competition? A dynamic panel analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(12), pages 7702-7711.
    9. repec:eee:enepol:v:108:y:2017:i:c:p:467-473 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Li, Weilin & Xu, Peng & Lu, Xing & Wang, Huilong & Pang, Zhihong, 2016. "Electricity demand response in China: Status, feasible market schemes and pilots," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 981-994.
    11. Catherine Waddams Price and Minyan Zhu, 2016. "Non-discrimination Clauses: Their Effect on British Retail Energy Prices," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    12. Littlechild, Stephen, 2006. "Competition and contracts in the Nordic residential electricity markets," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 135-147, September.
    13. Evens SALIES, 2005. "The effect on retail charges of mergers in the GB electricity market," Econometrics 0506001, EconWPA.
    14. Dupont, B. & De Jonghe, C. & Olmos, L. & Belmans, R., 2014. "Demand response with locational dynamic pricing to support the integration of renewables," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 344-354.
    15. Jennings, Mark G., 2013. "A smarter plan? A policy comparison between Great Britain and Ireland's deployment strategies for rolling out new metering technologies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 462-468.
    16. Zhou, Kaile & Yang, Shanlin, 2015. "Demand side management in China: The context of China’s power industry reform," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 954-965.
    17. Karakatsani, Nektaria V. & Bunn, Derek W., 2008. "Intra-day and regime-switching dynamics in electricity price formation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1776-1797, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity Retail; Market Power; Non-linear Tariffs;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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