Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
The British electricity supply industry has, with the exception of Nuclear Electric, now been privatized. Bulk supplies of electricity are traded between two dominant generators and many suppliers in an unregulated `pool'. The generators submit a supply schedule of prices for each generating set and receive the market clearing price, which varies with demand over time. It has been claimed that such Bertrand competition should be highly competitive, bit we show that the Nash equilibrium in supply schedules implies a high mark-up on marginal cost and very substantial deadweight losses.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||May 1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:557. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.