Mechanism Design with Non-Contractible Information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2017. "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series 1702, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2016. "Signaling with Two Correlated Characteristics," Discussion Paper Series 1605, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2018. "Membership Mechanism," Discussion Paper Series 1804, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
More about this item
KeywordsNon-contractible information; First-order alignment; Simultaneous contracting;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2016-06-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2016-06-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2016-06-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2016-06-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2016-06-09 (Operations Research)
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