Mechanism Design with Non-Contractible Information
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References listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsNon-contractible information; Incomplete contract; Information structure;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-06-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2016-06-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2016-06-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2016-06-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2016-06-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2016-06-09 (Operations Research)
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