IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v104y2014i1p66-83.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Aligned Delegation

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Frankel

Abstract

A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms? those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference types. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call "aligned delegation": all agent types play identically, as if they shared the principal's preferences. Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of ranking mechanisms, budgets, or sequential quotas.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Frankel, 2014. "Aligned Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 66-83, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:1:p:66-83
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.66
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.1.66
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/jan2014/20111324_app.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/jan2014/20111324_ds.zip
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    2. Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell, 2013. "The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1541-1599, July.
    3. Cohn, Zachary, 2010. "A note on linked bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 238-247, March.
    4. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.
    5. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Continuity in mechanism design without transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 182-189, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Delegating performance evaluation," ECON - Working Papers 266, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2018.
    2. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," Working Papers 062-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Lea Cassar, 2014. "Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission," ECON - Working Papers 150, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2014.
    4. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," NBER Working Papers 20315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    6. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic nonmonetary incentives," Economics Working Papers 1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Auster, Sarah, 2018. "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    8. Carl E. Walsh, 2015. "Day Two Keynote Address: Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 295-352, September.
    9. Demeze, Herman & Moyouwou, Issofa & Pongou, Roland, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," MPRA Paper 70607, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2015. "Robust Mechanisms: the curvature case," Textos para discussão 642, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    11. Carl Walsh, 2015. "Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 5293, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Tapas Kundu & Tore Nilssen, 2017. "Delegation of Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6589, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    14. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0558-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    16. La Spada, Gabriele, 2015. "Competition, reach for yield, and money market funds," Staff Reports 753, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, revised 01 Jan 2017.
    17. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives," Working Papers 938, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    18. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2015. "Robust Selling Mechanisms," Textos para discussão 641, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    19. Frankel, Alexander, 2016. "Discounted quotas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 396-444.
    20. Alex Frankel, 2016. "Delegating Multiple Decisions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 16-53, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:1:p:66-83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.