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Signaling with Two Correlated Characteristics

Listed author(s):
  • Seung Han Yoo

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea)

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    This paper generalizes the canonical feature of signaling models that signaling costs are negatively correlated with productive capabilities. A worker has two characteristics - signaling cost (low/high) and productive capability (low/high) - each combination of which can be realized with positive probability. The main results identify one key condition to guarantee the existence of a unique (partially) separating equilibrium. This finding has new implications for the role of education or a pre-signaling stage that induces the condition to hold.

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    File URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w1605.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 1605.

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    Date of creation: 2016
    Handle: RePEc:iek:wpaper:1605
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    1. Kelly Bedard, 2001. "Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 749-775, August.
    2. Ramey, Garey, 1996. "D1 Signaling Equilibria with Multiple Signals and a Continuum of Types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 508-531, May.
    3. John H. Tyler & Richard J. Murnane & John B. Willett, 2000. "Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 431-468.
    4. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    5. Riley, John G, 1979. "Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 227-252, October.
    6. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    7. Seung Han Yoo, 2016. "Mechanism Design with Two Types of Information," Discussion Paper Series 1604, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    8. Kevin Lang & David Kropp, 1986. "Human Capital Versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 609-624.
    9. Quinzii, Martine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1985. "Multidimensional signalling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-284, June.
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