Harmful transparency in teams
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Transparency; team; perfect substitution; free-riding;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2016-03-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SEA-2016-03-29 (South East Asia)
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