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The Influence of Transparency on Investments in Climate Protecting - An Economic Experiment

Listed author(s):
  • Elmar A. Janssen

    ()

    (University of Paderborn)

Registered author(s):

    Climate change is one of the biggest problems humankind is currently facing. Therefore, there have recently been a rising number of studies which analyze the economic components of climate change. Especially experimental economics offer a promising way to circumvent the missing data problem and the lack of control in the field. The present study experimentally analyzes the influence of transparency on investments in climate protection using a collective-risk social dilemma framework. The results are as follows: There is a positive influence of transparency on investments in climate change, but it turns out to be not significant. However, the results of the present study taken together with the results of former studies using the same framework indicate that information saliency regarding climate change and climate protection have a huge promoting influence on investments in climate protection and therefore could be a part of the solution of the climate change problem.

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    File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/dispap/DP06.pdf
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    Paper provided by Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics in its series Working Papers Dissertations with number 06.

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    Length: 40
    Date of creation: Jul 2014
    Handle: RePEc:pdn:dispap:06
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    Phone: 05251/60-2108
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    Web page: http://wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/
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