What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?
The laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit markets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement.
Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.narea.org/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy Cason, 2003. "Buyer Liability and Voluntary Inspections in International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(1), pages 101-127, May.
- Bohm, Peter & Carlen, Bjorn, 1999. "Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-66, January.
- John Stranlund & Christopher Costello & Carlos Chávez, 2005. "Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 181-204, 09.
- Aldo Rustichini, 1992.
"Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information,"
995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September.
- Cason Timothy N., 1993. "Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 177-195, September.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004.
"Emissions Variability in Tradable Permit Markets with Imperfect Enforcement and Banking,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
917, The University of Melbourne.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2006. "Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 199-216, October.
- Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 217-233, October.
- Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2009.
"Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students,"
Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 113-132, March.
- Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2006. "Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 975, The University of Melbourne.
- James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2005.
"A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement,"
2005-1, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
- Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2007. "A laboratory investigation of compliance behavior under tradable emissions rights: Implications for targeted enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 196-212, March.
- Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M., 2011.
"An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 414-429.
- John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon, 2010. "An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets," Working Papers 2010-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
- John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon, 2011. "An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets," Working Papers 2011-01, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- Ellerman,A. Denny & Joskow,Paul L. & Schmalensee,Richard & Montero,Juan-Pablo & Bailey,Elizabeth M., 2000.
"Markets for Clean Air,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521660839, june. pag.
- Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March.
- Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:90819. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.