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Reprint of: Price and quantity collars for stabilizing emission allowance prices: Laboratory experiments on the EU ETS market stability reserve

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  • Holt, Charles A.
  • Shobe, William M.

Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments, with financially motivated participants, comparing alternative proposals for managing the time path of emission allowance prices in the face of random firm-specific and market-level structural shocks. Market outcome measures such as social surplus and price variability are improved by the use of a price collar (auction reserve price and soft price cap). Comparable performance enhancements are not observed with the implementation of a quantity collar that adjusts auction quantities in response to privately held inventories of unused allowances. In some specifications, the quantity collar performed worse than no stabilization policy at all. The experiment implemented a specific set of structural elements, and extrapolation to other settings should be done with caution. Nevertheless, an examination of the observed behavioral patterns and deviations from optimal behavior suggests that a price collar has an important (although perhaps not exclusive) role to play in constructing an effective market stability policy.

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  • Holt, Charles A. & Shobe, William M., 2016. "Reprint of: Price and quantity collars for stabilizing emission allowance prices: Laboratory experiments on the EU ETS market stability reserve," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 69-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:80:y:2016:i:c:p:69-86
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.01.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhao, Xin-gang & Jiang, Gui-wu & Nie, Dan & Chen, Hao, 2016. "How to improve the market efficiency of carbon trading: A perspective of China," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1229-1245.
    2. Anne Schopp & William Acworth & Daniel Huppmann & Karsten Neuhoff, 2015. "Modelling a Market Stability Reserve in Carbon Markets," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1483, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Requate, Till & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Kean Siang, Ch'ng & Waichman, Israel, 2019. "Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 133-152.
    4. Jiang, Minxing & Zhu, Bangzhu & Wei, Yi-Ming & Chevallier, Julien & He, Kaijian, 2018. "An intertemporal carbon emissions trading system with cap adjustment and path control," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 152-161.
    5. Xu, Jia & Tan, Xiujie & He, Gang & Liu, Yu, 2019. "Disentangling the drivers of carbon prices in China's ETS pilots — An EEMD approach," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-9.
    6. Brink, Corjan & Vollebergh, Herman R.J. & van der Werf, Edwin, 2016. "Carbon pricing in the EU: Evaluation of different EU ETS reform options," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 603-617.
    7. Simon Quemin & Christian Perthuis, 2019. "Transitional Restricted Linkage Between Emissions Trading Schemes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 1-32, September.
    8. Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2020. "Mind your Ps and Qs! An Experiment on Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Discussion Papers Series 618, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    9. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018. "Permit market auctions with allowance reserves," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 283-306.
    10. Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2019. "Cost containment in pollution auctions," Discussion Papers Series 610, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    11. Raphaël Trotignon & Pierre-André Jouvet & Boris Solier & Simon Quemin & Jérémy Elbeze, 2015. "European carbon market: lessons on the impact of a market stability reserve using the Zephyr model," Working Papers 1511, Chaire Economie du climat.
    12. Jin, Jiayu & Han, Liyan & Wu, Lei & Zeng, Hongchao, 2020. "The hedging effect of green bonds on carbon market risk," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    13. Stavins, Robert N., 2019. "The Future of U.S. Carbon-Pricing Policy: Normative Assessment and Positive Prognosis," Working Paper Series rwp19-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    14. Sascha Kollenberg & Luca Taschini, 2015. "The European Union Emissions Trading System and the Market Stability Reserve: Optimal Dynamic Supply Adjustment," CESifo Working Paper Series 5380, CESifo.
    15. Grischa Perino & Maximilian Willner, 2019. "Rushing the Impatient: Allowance Reserves and the Time Profile of Low-Carbon Investments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(2), pages 845-863, October.
    16. Javad Khazaei & Michael Coulon & Warren B. Powell, 2017. "ADAPT: A Price-Stabilizing Compliance Policy for Renewable Energy Certificates: The Case of SREC Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(6), pages 1429-1445, December.

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