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Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

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Listed:
  • John Stranlund
  • Christopher Costello
  • Carlos Chávez

Abstract

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • John Stranlund & Christopher Costello & Carlos Chávez, 2005. "Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 181-204, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:28:y:2005:i:2:p:181-204
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-3108-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2002. "The Temporal Efficiency of SO2 Emissions Trading," Documentos de Trabajo 225, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carmen Arguedas & Francisco Cabo & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2017. "Optimal Pollution Standards and Non-compliance in a Dynamic Framework," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(3), pages 537-567, November.
    2. Chevallier, Julien & Le Pen, Yannick & Sévi, Benoît, 2011. "Options introduction and volatility in the EU ETS," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 855-880.
    3. Ian MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2012. "Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 180-203, October.
    4. John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September.
    5. Quemin, Simon & Trotignon, Raphaël, 2021. "Emissions trading with rolling horizons," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    6. Aude Pommeret & Katheline Schubert, 2018. "Intertemporal Emission Permits Trading Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 73-97, September.
    7. Timothy N. Cason & Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan, 2021. "Complying with environmental regulations: experimental evidence," Chapters, in: Ananish Chaudhuri (ed.), A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics, chapter 4, pages 69-92, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Cason, Timothy N., 2010. "What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 1-11, April.
    9. Chesney, Marc & Taschini, Luca & Wang, Mei, 2011. "Regulated and non-regulated companies, technology adoption in experimental markets for emission permits, and options contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37577, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M. & Zirogiannis, Nikolaos, 2019. "Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    11. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    12. Alessio D’Amato & Edilio Valentini, 2011. "Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 141-159, October.
    13. Simon Quemin & Raphael Trotignon, 2018. "Competitive Permit Storage and Market Design: An Application to the EU-ETS," Working Papers 2018.19, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    14. Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M., 2011. "An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 414-429.
    15. Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Paper Series 14522, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
    16. Luca Taschini & Marc Chesney & Mei Wang, 2014. "Experimental comparison between markets on dynamic permit trading and investment in irreversible abatement with and without non-regulated companies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 23-50, August.
    17. Franz Wirl & Juergen Noll, 2008. "Abatement and Permits when Pollution is Uncertain and Violations are Fined," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 299-312, June.
    18. Restiani, Phillia & Betz, Regina, 2010. "A Theoretical Model of Optimal Compliance Decisions under Different Penalty Designs in Emissions Trading Markets," Research Reports 107585, Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub.
    19. Pauli Lappi, 2017. "Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1081-1099, December.
    20. Julien Chevallier & Yannick Le Pen & Benoît Sévi, 2009. "Options introduction and volatility in the EU ETS," Working Papers hal-04140857, HAL.
    21. Julien Chevallier & Yannick Le Pen & Benoît Sévi, 2009. "Options Introduction and Volatility in the EU ETS," Working Papers halshs-00405709, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    compliance; enforcement; emissions trading; permit banking; L51; Q28;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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