A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking
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- Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2003. "A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking," Documentos de Trabajo 236, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2004. "A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking," Working Papers 0405, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele, 2009.
"Banking permits: Economic efficiency and distributional effects,"
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Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 382-403, May.
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More about this item
Keywordsbanking; market power; pollution permit; Q52; L13;
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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