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Valuing Options in Water Markets: A Laboratory Investigation

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  • Kristiana Hansen
  • Jonathan Kaplan
  • Stephan Kroll

Abstract

Risk and reliability dominate water supply discussions in the arid western United States due to increasing demand and finite, weather-dependent supply. Water markets have evolved in this region so agencies could meet this growing demand. In a few instances, water agencies turned to contractual mechanisms such as options to manage supply. As demand continues to grow option markets and other novel approaches to allocating water may become increasingly popular. We utilize experimental economics to analyze the effect of annual options on water markets in the absence of sufficient real-world data for conventional econometric analysis. We find gains from trade are higher when options can be traded. Additionally, gains are more evenly distributed, particularly with a dominant buyer and many sellers. Findings suggest option markets may be a viable choice as policymakers prepare for future droughts. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

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  • Kristiana Hansen & Jonathan Kaplan & Stephan Kroll, 2014. "Valuing Options in Water Markets: A Laboratory Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 57(1), pages 59-80, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:57:y:2014:i:1:p:59-80
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9659-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Françeska Tomori & Erik Ansink & Harold Houba & Nick Hagerty & Charles Bos, 2021. "Market power in California's water market," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-011/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Tomori, Françeska & Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold & Hagerty, Nick & Bos, Charles, 2021. "Market power in California’s water market," Working Papers 2072/534854, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Alistair Munro & Marieta Valente, 2016. "Green Goods: Are They Good or Bad News for the Environment? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment on Impure Public Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(2), pages 317-335, October.
    4. Craig D. Broadbent & David S. Brookshire & Don Coursey & Vince Tidwell, 2017. "Futures Contracts in Water Leasing: An Experimental Analysis Using Basin Characteristics of the Rio Grande, NM," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(3), pages 569-594, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dry-year options; Experimental economics; Market design; Water markets; Water resource allocation; D23; L22; Q25;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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