Emissions Trading with Shares and Coupons when Control over Discharges is Uncertain
Two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking of permits (coupons) and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits (shares). Banking is predicted to reduce price instability when firms trade in a reconciliation market after the quantity of emissions has been determined. Tradable shares are a common feature in proposals for emissions trading in Canada. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how bankable coupons and tradable shares affect efficiency and prices under uncertainty. Cognitive demands on the subjects are reduced by computerized advice on the optimal allocation of coupons across periods and the implied marginal values of coupons and shares. Banking, share trading and uncertainty conditions are introduced in a complete factorial design with three observations per cell. High efficiencies are observed across all treatments. Uncertainty in the control of emissions leads to substantial price instability when banking is not allowed. Banking virtually eliminates the instability, but reduces the efficiency of the market institution. Share trading reduces trading volumes, increases price stability and improves efficiency.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4|
Phone: (905) 525-9140 ext. 22765
Fax: (905) 521-8232
Web page: http://www.mcmaster.ca/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ledyard, John O. & Szakaly, Kristin E., "undated".
"Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights,"
838, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Ledyard, John O. & Szakaly-Moore, Kristin, 1994. "Designing organizations for trading pollution rights," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 167-196, October.
- John Ledyard & Kristin Szakaly-Moore, 1993. "Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights," Experimental 9307001, EconWPA, revised 28 Jul 1993.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March.
- Dale A. Carlson & Anne M. Sholtz, 1994. "Designing Pollution Market Instruments: Cases Of Uncertainty," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(4), pages 114-125, October.
- Stuart Mestelman & Andrew Muller, 1994.
"Emission Trading with Shares and Coupons : A Laboratory Experiment,"
McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications
1994-01, McMaster University.
- R. Andrew Muller & Stuart Mestelman, 1994. "Emission Trading with Shares and Coupons: A Laboratory Experiment," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 185-211.
- Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
- Hahn, Robert W, 1989. "Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 95-114, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcm:mceelp:1997-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.