How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?
A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. The main approaches used to allocate catch shares include: (i) auctions, (ii) equal allocation, (iii) historical catch records and (iv) vessel- or gear-based rules. 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai‘i and across the globe.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822|
Web page: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/
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