The Promise of Transferable Fishing Concessions on EU Fisheries
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Kanik, Zafer & Kucuksenel, Serkan, 2014. "The Promise of Transferable Fishing Concessions on EU Fisheries," 88th Annual Conference, April 9-11, 2014, AgroParisTech, Paris, France 170526, Agricultural Economics Society.
References listed on IDEAS
- Newell, Richard G. & Sanchirico, James N. & Kerr, Suzi, 2005. "Fishing quota markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 437-462, May.
- Zafer Kanik & Serkan Kucuksenel, 2013. "Implementation of the Maximum Sustainable Yield under an Age-Structured Model," ERC Working Papers 1303, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Mar 2013.
- John Stranlund & Carlos Chávez, 2013.
"Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 53-79, August.
- John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez, 2011. "Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax?," Working Papers 2011-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
- Kenta Tanaka & Keisaku Higashida & Shunsuke Managi, 2014.
"A laboratory assessment of the choice of vessel size under individual transferable quota regimes,"
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 58(3), pages 353-373, July.
- HIGASHIDA Keisaku & MANAGI Shunsuke, 2010. "Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) when Fishers are able to Choose Vessel Sizes: An experimental approach," Discussion papers 10036, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Keisaku Higahsida & Kenta Tanaka & Shunsuke Managi, 2010. "Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) when Fishers are able to Choose Vessel Sizes: An Experimental Approach," Discussion Paper Series 57, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jun 2010.
- Da Rocha, José-María & Cerviño, Santiago & Villasante, Sebastian, 2012. "The Common Fisheries Policy: An enforcement problem," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1309-1314.
- Anderson, Lee G., 1991. "A note on market power in ITQ fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 291-296, November.
- Lynham, John, 2014.
"How have catch shares been allocated?,"
Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 42-48.
- John Lynham, 2012. "How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?," Working Papers 201219, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- John Lynham, 2013. "How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?," Working Papers 2013-8, University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
- Grafton, R.Q. & McIlgorm, A., 2009. "Ex ante evaluation of the costs and benefits of individual transferable quotas: A case-study of seven Australian commonwealth fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 714-719, July.
- Anders Skonhoft & Niels Vestergaard & Martin Quaas, 2012. "Optimal Harvest in an Age Structured Model with Different Fishing Selectivity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(4), pages 525-544, April.
- R. Quentin Grafton & Ragnar Arnason & Trond Bjorndal & David Campbell & Harry F. Campbell & Colin W. Clark & Robin Connor & Diane P. Dupont & Rognvaldur Hannesson & Ray Hilborn & James E. Kirkley & To, 2005.
"Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries,"
Economics and Environment Network Working Papers
0508, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
- Grafton, Quentin R. & Arnason, Ragnar & Bjorndal, Trond & Campbell, David & Campbell, Harry F. & Clark, Colin W. & Connor, Robin & Dupont, Diane P. & Hannesson, Rognvaldur & Hillborn, Ray & Kirkley, J, 2006. "Incentive-Based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12766, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Anthony Cox, 2009. "Quota Allocation in International Fisheries," OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers 22, OECD Publishing.
More about this item
KeywordsTransferable fishing concessions; Maximum sustainable yield; Small-scale fishermen; Individual transferable quotas; Age-structured model.;
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:met:wpaper:1312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Erol Taymaz) or (Candi Patterson) or (Katrina Wingle). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ermettr.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.