Auction Design for a Strategic Reserve Market for Generation Adequacy: On the Incentives Under Different Auction Scoring Rules
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More about this item
Keywordselectricity; generation adequacy; market design; auction design; reserve market;
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
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