A theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in Germany
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L & Wilson, Bart J, 2003. "Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 109-123, March.
- Kahn, Alfred E. & Cramton, Peter C. & Porter, Robert H. & Tabors, Richard D., 2001.
"Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond,"
The Electricity Journal,
Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 70-79, July.
- Alfred E. Kahn & Peter Cramton & Robert H. Porter & Richard D. Tabors, 2001. "Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond," Papers of Peter Cramton 01ej, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 27 Jan 2001.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014.
"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
- Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
- Federico, Giulio & Rahman, David, 2003. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 175-211, September.
- Fabra, Natalia & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik & Harbord, David, 2002. "Modeling Electricity Auctions," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(7), pages 72-81.
- Woo, Chi-Keung & Lloyd, Debra & Tishler, Asher, 2003. "Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 1103-1115, September.
- Borenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James, 1999.
"An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 285-323, September.
- Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, 1998. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry," NBER Working Papers 6463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Goswami, Gautam & Noe, Thomas H & Rebello, Michael J, 1996.
"Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 757-785.
- Gautam Goswami & Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello, 1995. "Collusion in uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implications for Treasury auctions," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 95-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Heim, Sven & Götz, Georg, 2013.
"Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
13-035, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Sven Heim & Georg Götz, 2013. "Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201324, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Kai Flinkerbusch, "undated". "A more efficient procurement mechanism for reserve capacity in the German market for balancing power," Working Papers 201178, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
- repec:eee:enepol:v:109:y:2017:i:c:p:400-413 is not listed on IDEAS
- Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff, and Dragan Jovanovic, 2014.
"Competition in Germany's Minute Reserve Power Market: An Econometric Analysis,"
The Energy Journal,
International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
- Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Jovanovic, Dragan, 2012. "Competition in Germany's minute reserve power market: An econometric analysis," DICE Discussion Papers 75, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Hirth, Lion & Ziegenhagen, Inka, 2015. "Balancing power and variable renewables: Three links," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1035-1051.
- Flinkerbusch, Kai, 2011. "A more efficient procurement mechanism for reserver capacity in the German market for balancing power," CAWM Discussion Papers 52, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).
- Lion Hirth & Inka Ziegenhagen, 2013. "Control Power and Variable Renewables A Glimpse at German Data," Working Papers 2013.46, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Rammerstorfer, Margarethe & Wagner, Christian, 2009. "Reforming minute reserve policy in Germany: A step towards efficient markets?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3513-3519, September.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:36:y:2008:i:7:p:2620-2627. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.