Modeling Electricity Auctions
The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has led certain regulatory authorities to prefer discriminatory auctions on the basis of reasoning from models which are not directly applicable to any existing electricity market. Vickrey auctions, although often recommended by economists, have also been ignored in these debates. This article describes the approach which we believe should be taken to analyzing these issues.
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Volume (Year): 15 (2002)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
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