A more efficient procurement mechanism for reserve capacity in the German market for balancing power
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsElectricity market; balancing power; uniform-price auction; pay-as-bid auction;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- N74 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: 1913-
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
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