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Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown

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  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Yuichi Yamamoto

Abstract

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and show that it can be characterized with an extension of the techniques used to study perfect public equilibria. We develop identifiability conditions that are sufficient for a folk theorem; these conditions imply that there are PPXE in which the payoffs are approximately the same as if the monitoring structure and payoff functions were known. Finally, we define perfect type-contingently public ex post equilibria (PTXE), which allows players to condition their actions on their initial private information, and we provide its linear programming characterization. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Drew Fudenberg & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2010. "Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1673-1710, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:5:p:1673-1710
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    Cited by:

    1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
    3. Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    4. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    5. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    6. Kimmo Berg & Markus Kärki, 2018. "Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-17, July.
    7. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2015.
    8. Yves Breitmoser, 2015. "Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2882-2910, September.
    9. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 19 May 2018.
    10. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
    11. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
    12. Bhattacharya, Vivek & Manuelli, Lucas & Straub, Ludwig, 2018. "Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 1-37.
    13. Joyee Deb & Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 917-964, May.
    14. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2019. "Stochastic games with hidden states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    15. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
    16. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
    17. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Belief free equilibria," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    19. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    20. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    21. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    22. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 617-637, November.
    23. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    24. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Folk Theorems, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2013.
    25. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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