Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee
This article reexamines the experience of the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s railroad cartel, to assess the applicability of the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) theories of price wars. After discussing necessary modifications to the theories, I estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars, the cyclical nature of pricing, and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given. The estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 25 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:spring:p:37-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.