IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/cesdoc/b08041.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bargaining over public goods

Author

Listed:

Abstract

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem

Suggested Citation

  • Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & César Martinelli, 2008. "Bargaining over public goods," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08041, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:b08041
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/B08041.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dávila, J. & Eeckhout, J., 2008. "Competitive bargaining equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 269-294, March.
    5. Thomson, William, 1999. " Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 139-176.
    6. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September.
    7. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(01), pages 73-88, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anne Van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2018. "Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01720001, HAL.
    2. Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowka, 2018. "Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18004, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; bargaining; alternating offers;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:b08041. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.