Bargaining over Public Goods
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bar- gaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lin- dahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The pro- cedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11, 6, 927-945|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00633592|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout, 2004.
"Competitive Bargaining Equilibria,"
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques
b04067, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- DAVILA, Julio & EECKHOUT, Jan, . "Competitive bargaining equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Julio Dávila & Jan Eeckhout, 2004. "Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00633592. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.