Bargaining over public goods
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2008.41 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00289435|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977.
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