Game-Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies, A
Emphasizes the interdependence between public policies and players' bargaining strengths and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. Illustration of the proposed framework by analyzing the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal; Impact of exogeneous shocks on price policies.
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|Date of creation:||01 Feb 1990|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, February 1990, vol. 72 no. 1, pp. 138-148|
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