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Xavier Calsamiglia

Personal Details

First Name:Xavier
Middle Name:
Last Name:Calsamiglia
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pca742
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Universitat Pompeu Fabra Trias Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona Spain
Terminal Degree:1975 Department of Economics; University of Minnesota (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Barcelona, Spain
http://www.econ.upf.edu/

: (34) 935 42 1766
(34)935 42 17 46
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona
RePEc:edi:deupfes (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Barcelona, Spain
http://www.barcelonagse.eu/

: +34 93 542-1222
+34 93 542-1223
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona
RePEc:edi:bargses (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2010. "Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure," Economics Working Papers 1226, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2004. "Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?," Economics Working Papers 865, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Xavier Calsamiglia & Alan Kirman, 1991. "A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes," Economics Working Papers 7, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

Articles

  1. Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
  2. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1982. "On the size of the message space under non-convexities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2-3), pages 197-203, September.
  3. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1978. "Composite Goods and Revealed Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(2), pages 395-404, June.
  4. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2010. "Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure," Economics Working Papers 1226, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

    Cited by:

    1. Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire & Wallace E. Oates, 2017. "Strength in Diversity? Fiscal Federalism among the Fifty U.S. States," Working Papers 1001, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

  2. Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2004. "Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?," Economics Working Papers 865, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

    Cited by:

    1. Ferrario, Caterina & Zanardi, Alberto, 2011. "Fiscal decentralization in the Italian NHS: What happens to interregional redistribution?," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 71-80, April.
    2. Roberto Guerrero Compeán, 2008. "Decentralization: Panacea or Pandora’s Box? Fiscal Perversity in Mexico," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(2), pages 89-110, November.

  3. Xavier Calsamiglia & Alan Kirman, 1991. "A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes," Economics Working Papers 7, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
    2. Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    3. Bosch-Domenech, A. & Silvestre, J., 1995. "Credit Constraint in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Department of Economics 95-07, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    4. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
    5. Maître Philippe, 1999. "La Notion D'equite : Une Revue," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24, March.
    6. Alan Kirman, 2006. "Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explanation to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road," Economics Working Papers 0073, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    7. Guoqiang Tian, 2006. "The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 155-182, January.
    8. Jose Aizpurua & Antonio Manresa, 1994. "A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 141-158, December.
    9. Marschak, Thomas & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1998. "Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 106-141, March.
    10. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
    11. Tian, Guoqiang, 2001. "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper 41229, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2005.

Articles

  1. Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1982. "On the size of the message space under non-convexities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2-3), pages 197-203, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.

  3. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
    2. Singh, Ajit, 2011. "Comparative advantage, industrial policy and the World Bank: back to first principles," MPRA Paper 53042, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
    4. Antonio Villar, 1994. "Existence and efficiency of equilibrium in economics with increasing returns to scale: an exposition," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(2), pages 205-243, May.
    5. Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 325-337, December.
    6. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
    7. Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    8. Kaplan, Todd R. & Wettstein, David, 1999. "Cost sharing: efficiency and implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 489-502, December.
    9. Loehman, Edna & Dinar, Ariel, 1992. "Cooperative Technology Solutions to Externality Problems: The Case of Irrigation Water," Working Papers 232418, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    10. Jordan, J. S. & Xu, Dingbo, 1999. "On the Communication Complexity of Expected-Profit Maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 185-202, June.
    11. Leonid Hurwicz, 2008. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-585, June.
    12. Murty, Sushama, 2010. "Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 331-353, January.
    13. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
    14. Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
    15. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
    16. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    17. Tian, Guoqiang, 2001. "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper 41229, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2005.
    18. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 526-545, May.
    20. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (3) 2005-09-29 2007-01-02 2010-07-24
  2. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (2) 2007-01-02 2010-07-24
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2007-01-02

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