Credit Constraint in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results
The authors' work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness or expansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. They report on some double-action, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequality involving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterized by high and low credit availability. The authors' main results are that changes in the availability of credit: (1) have minor and unsystematic effects on quantities and relative prices in the high-credit regime; and (2) have substantial effects, both on quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
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- Juan P. Nicolini, 1993. "More on the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy," Economics Working Papers 56, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Walter Garcia-Fontes & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2000.
"Entry restrictions and the determination of quality,"
Spanish Economic Review,
Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 105-127.
- Walter Garcia Fontes & Hugo Hopenhayn, 1992. "Entry restrictions and the determination of quality," Economics Working Papers 10, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Xavier Calsamiglia & Alan Kirman, 1991.
"A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes,"
Economics Working Papers
7, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-72, September.
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