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Is Corruption an Efficient Grease ?

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon
  • Laurent Weill

    () (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Strasbourg)

Abstract

This paper tests whether corruption can be viewed as an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It does so by analyzing the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 54 countries both developed and developing. Using three measures of corruption and five measures of other aspects of governance, we repeatedly observe that corruption is always detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. We thus find evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Laurent Weill, 2008. "Is Corruption an Efficient Grease ?," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2008-06, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2008-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; corruption; income; aggregate productivity; efficiency.;

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence

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