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The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions

  • Axel Dreher


  • Lars-H. Siemers


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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 140 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 245-265

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:1:p:245-265
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  1. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
  2. Bai, Chong-en & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2001. "The quality of bureaucracy and capital account policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2575, The World Bank.
  3. North, Douglass C., 1993. "Economic Performance through Time," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1993-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  4. R Blundell & Steven Bond, . "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data model," Economics Papers W14&104., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  5. Alan C. Stockman & Alejandro Hernandez D., 1985. "Exchange Controls, Capital Controls, and International Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 1755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
  7. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
  8. Jesper Roine, 2006. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 107-134, January.
  9. William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison & Zhipeng Yan, 2003. "Rent Seeking into the Income Distribution," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 441-456, November.
  10. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1994. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," NBER Technical Working Papers 0151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
  12. Gökhan Karahan & R. Coats & William Shughart, 2006. "Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 87-106, January.
  13. Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," Scholarly Articles 4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Tomaso Duso, 2005. "Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 251-276, March.
  15. Sebastian Edwards, 1999. "How Effective Are Capital Controls?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 65-84, Fall.
  16. Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2006. "Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  17. Leonardo Bartolini & Allan Drazen, 1996. "Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal," NBER Working Papers 5725, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. J. E. Stiglitz, 1999. "Introduction," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 28(3), pages 249-254, November.
  19. Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman & Reis Soares, Rodrigo, 2001. "Accountability and corruption : political institutions matter," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2708, The World Bank.
  20. Dooley, Michael P & Isard, Peter, 1980. "Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 370-84, April.
  21. Heckelman, Jac C, 2000. " Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 319-27, September.
  22. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  23. Axel Dreher, 2005. "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization," TWI Research Paper Series 6, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universit�t Konstanz.
  24. Christopher J. Neely, 1999. "An introduction to capital controls," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 13-30.
  25. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
  26. Rose-Ackerman,Susan, 1999. "Corruption and Government," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521632935.
  27. Rose-Ackerman,Susan, 1999. "Corruption and Government," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521659123.
  28. Glick, Reuven & Hutchison, Michael, 2005. "Capital controls and exchange rate instability in developing economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 387-412, April.
  29. Daniel Horgos & Klaus Zimmermann, 2009. "Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 301-315, March.
  30. Axel Dreher & Thomas Herzfeld, 2005. "The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence," Public Economics 0506001, EconWPA.
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