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The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions

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  • Axel Dreher

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  • Lars-H. Siemers

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:1:p:245-265
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9423-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    3. Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis González & Werner Güth, 2008. "Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 103-117, October.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    5. Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005. "Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 1-35, March.
    6. Stockman, Alan C & Hernandez D, Alejandro, 1988. "Exchange Controls, Capital Controls, and International Financial Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 362-374, June.
    7. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
    8. Axel Dreher & Thomas Herzfeld, 2005. "The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence," Public Economics 0506001, EconWPA.
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    12. Bai, Chong-en & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2001. "The quality of bureaucracy and capital account policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2575, The World Bank.
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    16. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    17. Axel Dreher, 2006. "Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(10), pages 1091-1110.
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    19. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    20. Gökhan Karahan & R. Coats & William Shughart, 2006. "Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 87-106, January.
    21. Sebastian Edwards, 1999. "How Effective Are Capital Controls?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 65-84, Fall.
    22. Dooley, Michael P & Isard, Peter, 1980. "Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 370-384, April.
    23. Jesper Roine, 2006. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 107-134, January.
    24. William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison & Zhipeng Yan, 2003. "Rent Seeking into the Income Distribution," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 441-456, November.
    25. Glick, Reuven & Hutchison, Michael, 2005. "Capital controls and exchange rate instability in developing economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 387-412, April.
    26. Kunicov , Jana & Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(04), pages 573-606, October.
    27. Christopher J. Neely, 1999. "An introduction to capital controls," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 13-30.
    28. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rajeev K. Goel & Aaron N. Mehrotra, 2012. "Financial payment instruments and corruption," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(11), pages 877-886, June.
    2. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 244-259, March.
    3. Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Intelligence and corruption," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 109-112.
    4. Aizenman, Joshua & Noy, Ilan, 2006. "FDI and trade--Two-way linkages?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 317-337, July.
    5. Nedra Baklouti & Younes Boujelbene, 2015. "Exploring the Relationship between Democracy, Corruption and Economic Growth in MENA countries," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 11(3), pages 43-58, June.
    6. Gebhardt Heinz & Siemers Lars-H. R., 2017. "Die relative Steuerbelastung mittelständischer Kapitalgesellschaften: Evidenz von handelsbilanziellen Mikrodaten," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 1-35, April.
    7. Singh, Sunny & Bhattacharya, Kaushik, 2015. "Does easy availability of cash effect corruption? Evidence from panel of countries," MPRA Paper 65934, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Christian Bjørnskov, 2012. "Can bribes buy protection against international competition?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 148(4), pages 751-775, December.
    9. Artjoms Ivlevs & Timothy Hinks, 2015. "Global economic crisis and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 425-445, March.
    10. Indra Soysa & Krishna Vadlammanati, 2013. "Do pro-market economic reforms drive human rights violations? An empirical assessment, 1981–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 163-187, April.
    11. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2010. "When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 766-781, September.
    12. Atsushi Kato & Takahiro Sato, 2014. "The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 155-178, May.
    13. Seo-Young Cho, 2011. "Integrating Equality - Globalization, Women’s Rights, Son Preference and Human Trafficking," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 73, Courant Research Centre PEG.
    14. Rui P. Esteves, 2011. "The Political Economy of Global Financial Liberalisation in Historical Perspective," Oxford University Economic and Social History Series _089, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    15. repec:eee:ecosys:v:41:y:2017:i:2:p:236-247 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Capital account restrictions; Rent-seeking; Tax avoidance; Tax evasion; C33; D19; F33; G11; H26; O17;

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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