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Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry

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  • Tomaso Duso

Abstract

In this paper we empirically test the simultaneity between the effects and the determinants of price regulation in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find that the regulatory regime is endogenous to firms pricing strategies. Because of lobbying successfulness, firms avoided regulation in those markets where it would have been more effective. Therefore, regulation did not significantly reduce cellular tariffs in regulated markets but it would have decreased them if adopted in non-regulated ones. Also, we provide evidence that the choice of the regulatory regime strongly depends on the political as well as regulatory environments. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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  • Tomaso Duso, 2005. "Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 251-276, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:122:y:2005:i:3:p:251-276
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3293-y
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C34 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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