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Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

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  • Tomaso Duso
  • Astrid Jung

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms’ lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Produktmarktwettbewerb und Koordination im Lobbying in der U.S. Mobilfunkindustrie) Dieses Paper untersucht Marktverhalten und Lobbying durch Unternehmen empirisch in einem vereinheitlichten strukturellen Ansatz. In einem sequentiellen Spiel, wo die Firmen für Regulierung Lobbyismus betreiben, bevor sie im Produktmarkt konkurrieren, leiten wir ein testbares Maß für Lobbying- Koordination her. In einer Anwendung auf den frühen US Mobilfunkmarkt zeigen wir, dass Marktverhalten und Lobbying-Ausgaben (gemessen als Parteispenden) mit einem einfachen Nashgleichgewicht vereinbar sind und die Preisobergrenzen im Durchschnitt binden. Außerdem waren Parteispenden offenbar ein effektives Mittel um die Preisgrenzen zu lockern und kostenbezogene Regulierung abzumildern.
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Suggested Citation

  • Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2012. "Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-201, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:12:y:2012:i:2:p:177-201
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-010-0090-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collusion; lobbying; price caps; regulation; rent-seeking; interest groups; telecommunications; D72; L13; L51; L96; C31;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models

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