Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation
An FBI investigation of county purchasing activities in the mid 1980s resulted in the conviction of 55 of Mississippi's 410 county supervisors. Analyzing data from the state's 1987 county supervisor elections and hypothesizing that candidates' demands for votes increase as the gains from holding public office increase, we predict larger voter turnouts in the 26 of the state's 82 counties where supervisor corruption was exposed. Holding constant average voter turnout in the preceding U.S. presidential election and controlling for the competitiveness of supervisor races, we find that more Mississippians indeed voted in corrupt than in non-corrupt counties. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
Volume (Year): 126 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gökhan Karahan & Laura Razzolini & William Shughart, 2006. "No Pretense to Honesty: County Government Corruption in Mississippi," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 211-227, August.
- Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2004. "Political Economy of Antitrust," Chapters,in: The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Gökhan R. Karahan & Laura Razzolini & William F. Shughart II, 2002. "Centralized versus decentralized decision-making in a county government setting," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 101-115, 07.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.