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No Pretense to Honesty: County Government Corruption in Mississippi

Author

Listed:
  • Gökhan Karahan
  • Laura Razzolini
  • William Shughart

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Gökhan Karahan & Laura Razzolini & William Shughart, 2006. "No Pretense to Honesty: County Government Corruption in Mississippi," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 211-227, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:211-227
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0006-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    2. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    5. Jain, Arvind K, 2001. " Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 71-121, February.
    6. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    7. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gökhan Karahan & R. Coats & William Shughart, 2006. "Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 87-106, January.
    2. Francisco De Assis Oliveira Campos & Luiz Ivan De Melo Castelar, 2014. "Avaliação Da Corrupção Municipal A Partir De Microdados," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 075, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    3. Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016. "Corruption in Russia," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
    4. Marco Pani, 2011. "Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 163-196, July.
    5. Yang, Sheng-Ping & DeBeaumont, Ronald, 2010. "Pay as incentive or pay as reward? The case of Taiwan," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 76-86, February.
    6. Larrain B., Felipe & Tavares, José, 2007. "Can Openness Deter Corruption? The Role of Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Claudio Detotto & Bryan C. McCannon, 2017. "Economic freedom and public, non-market institutions: evidence from criminal prosecution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 107-128, May.
    8. Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Robert A. Giacalone, 2016. "Organizational Determinants of Ethical Dysfunctionality," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 1-12, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Rent seeking; County governments; Operation Pretense; D73; K42;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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