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Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count: what do wealth-effects tell us in Africa?

  • Asongu Simplice



Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth effects play-out when existing corruption-control levels matter in the corruption battle? To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established. (1) Population growth is a (an) tool (impediment) in (to) the fight against corruption in Low (Middle) income countries. (2) Democracy increases (decreases) corruption-control in Middle (Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income-levels and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.

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Paper provided by African Governance and Development Institute. in its series Working Papers with number 12/014.

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Length: 31
Date of creation: 24 Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Institutions and Economies
Handle: RePEc:agd:wpaper:12/014
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