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Exports and cross-national corruption: A disaggregated examination

  • Goel, Rajeev K.
  • Korhonen, Iikka

This paper empirically examines the relation between categories of exports and corruption across countries. Aggregate exports and agricultural exports tend to decrease corruption, while fuel exports increase corruption. The influence of agricultural exports in more pronounced in more corrupt nations, while fuel exports contribute to corruption in least corrupt nations. Manufacturing and ore exports, on the other hand, generally fail to show significant impacts on corruption. Our findings demonstrate that the resource curse is sensitive to prevailing corruption levels, and this finding is novel in the literature. Consistent with the extant literature, corruption decreases with income, and (at some corruption levels) as political freedom increases, and with larger government size. The findings are fairly robust to an alternate corruption measure.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Systems.

Volume (Year): 35 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 109-124

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:35:y:2011:i:1:p:109-124
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