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State of corruption in transition: case of the Czech Republic

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  • Lizal, Lubomir
  • Kocenda, Evzen

Abstract

Corruption has a negative impact on society and economy. The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) uncovered dormant possibilities for corruption and necessity for appropriate steps to be taken. We document the state of corruption in the Czech Republic and the measures introduced to fight it. We cover sectors of society and economy according to their importance of a consequential corruption hazard. We also described the government's program of anticorruption and its achievements and failures. The state of corruption in the country, measured by the Corruption Perception Index, presents a serious problem since the index does not improve as the transition process advances. Numerous comparative studies, however, suggest that corruption is more prominent feature in a number of other transition countries. We believe that the substantial change of approach to the institutional framework is necessary in order to prevent and fight corruption successfully.
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Suggested Citation

  • Lizal, Lubomir & Kocenda, Evzen, 2001. "State of corruption in transition: case of the Czech Republic," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 138-160, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:138-160
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    Cited by:

    1. Weill, Laurent, 2011. "How corruption affects bank lending in Russia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 230-243, June.
    2. Jan Svejnar & Evzen Kocenda, 2002. "The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 471, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. repec:hhs:bofitp:2009_005 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda & Jan Svejnar, 2007. "Origin and concentration," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15(1), pages 1-31, March.
    5. Goel, Rajeev K. & Korhonen, Iikka, 2011. "Exports and cross-national corruption: A disaggregated examination," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 109-124, March.
    6. Jan Hanousek & Evzen Kocenda & Jan Svejnar, 2004. "Ownership, Control and Corporate Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," Microeconomics 0406002, EconWPA.
    7. Chousa, Juan Pineiro & Khan, Haider A. & Melikyan, Davit & Tamazian, Artur, 2005. "Assessing institutional efficiency, growth and integration," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 69-84, April.
    8. repec:rom:rampas:v:2016:y:2016:i:26:p:78-96 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Evžen Kočenda & Jan Hanousek, 2012. "State ownership and control in the Czech Republic," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 157-191, August.
    10. Laurent Weill, 2011. "Does corruption hamper bank lending? Macro and micro evidence," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 25-42, August.
    11. Cristian Dragos & Daniela Beju & Simona Dragos, 2009. "Public and Financial Institutions in Transition Economies: An Overview and Recent Evidences from Central and Eastern Europe," Managing Global Transitions, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 7(2), pages 147-170.
    12. Petra Koudelkova & Wadim Strielkowski & Denisa Hejlova, 2015. "Corruption and System Change in the Czech Republic: Firm-level Evidence," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 1, pages 25-46, March.
    13. Ladislava Grochova & Tomas Otahal, 2011. "Corruption in the Czech and the Slovak Republics: Did the EU Pressure Improve Legal Enforcement?," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-04, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    14. Nemecek, Libor & Hanousek, Jan, 2002. "Market structure, liquidity, and information based trading at the Prague Stock Exchange," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 293-305, September.
    15. Jan Hanousek & Filip Palda, 2002. "Why People Evade Taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Tale of Twins," Public Economics 0205003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Ahmad Fawad, 2013. "Corruption and Information Sharing as Determinants of Non-Performing Loans," Business Systems Research, De Gruyter Open, vol. 4(1), pages 87-98, March.
    17. Pál Csapodi & István Takács & Katalin György-Takács, 2011. "Corruption as a Deviant Social Attitude," Public Finance Quarterly, State Audit Office of Hungary, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P27 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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