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The Paradox of Czech Crusaders: Will They Ever Learn the Corruption Lesson? (Corruption and Anticorruption in the Czech Republic)

Author

Listed:
  • Lubomir Lizal

    (CERGE-EI; W.Davidson Institute University of Michigan Business School; CEPR)

  • Evzen Kocenda

    (CERGE-EI; W.Davidson Institute University of Michigan Business School; CEPR)

Abstract

Corruption has a negative impact on society and economy. The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) uncovered dormant possibilities for corruption and necessity for appropriate steps to be taken. We document the state of corruption in the Czech Republic and the measures introduced to fight it. We cover sectors of society and economy according to their importance of a consequential corruption hazard. We also described the government's program of anticorruption and its achievements and failures. The state of corruption in the country, measured by the Corruption Perception Index, presents a serious problem since the index does not improve as the transition process advances. Numerous comparative studies, however, suggest that corruption is more prominent feature in a number of other transition countries. We believe that the substantial change of approach to the institutional framework is necessary in order to prevent and fight corruption successfully.

Suggested Citation

  • Lubomir Lizal & Evzen Kocenda, 2001. "The Paradox of Czech Crusaders: Will They Ever Learn the Corruption Lesson? (Corruption and Anticorruption in the Czech Republic)," Public Economics 0106004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0106004
    Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 24 ; figures: included
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

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