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Fighting Corruption when Existing Corruption-Control Levels Count: What do Wealth-Effects Tell us in Africa?

  • Simplice A. Asongu


    (African Governance and Development Institute,)

Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? Do income-levels matter in the fight against corruption when existing corruption-control levels also matter? In other words, how does the wealth of nations matter in the fight against corruption when corruption is assessed throughout the conditional distribution of corruption-control from countries with low initial levels of corruption-control to those with high initial levels of corruption-control. To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established: (1) Population growth is a tool in the fight against corruption in Low income countries. (2) Democracy increases corruption-control in Middle income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income levels and political will in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, anti-corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.

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Article provided by Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya in its journal Institutions and Economies.

Volume (Year): 5 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 53-74

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Handle: RePEc:umk:journl:v:5:y:2013:i:3:p:53-74
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